(Part 2) How to report on ISIS-attacks?
Fifth Newsletter
Below is the continuation of last week’s newsletter on attributions of responsibility for attacks. An attack is a form of communication. The question is who did it, and why.
Acts of violence in Afghanistan are often attributed to an ideological framework which is that of terrorism. We long percieved Afghanistan as a country with a terrorist threat. The claims by ISIS or accusations of the Taliban (blaming ISIS) are often accepted as the right attributions.
In our research, we showed how this ideological framework of seeing Afghanistan has resulted in misreporting on the real threats in Afghanistan. Leaning on the ideological framework often refrains the media from searching for the why behind an attack. By not looking for what has actually happened but instead filling it in, the media swiftly falls back into the construct of how we have understood Afghanistan. This master-narrative takes away the sometimes life-saving context; there is not enough attention on the political, social or economical aspects of these countries in comparison to the ideological explanation (they are terrorists!) which ostracize them.
Going against that narrative is not easy. By employing these ideological interpretations, the journalist can be sure that he/she is on tested ground.
This ISIS paper gives guidance on preventing the urge to press stories into a Western ideology (master narratives). It gives the reader confidence to develop a more complex idea about the conflict and step away from master narratives if necessary.
Colleague Matthieu Aikins (and a team within the NYT) received a Pulitzer this week for journalism that contains exactly this: cross-check. Aikins did this before and explained in Harpers Bazaar how an Afghan US ally misused the Taliban-narrative to kill rivals on a regular basis as well (and how these upset rivals were the base for the re-start of the Taliban after 0911)
In August 2021 when the US attacked a house in Kabul, claiming to have killed ISIS-members, it must have almost been a routine for Aikins (who was in Kabul at that time) to actually have a look at the scene. By going to the attack-side and talking to Afghans (and following Afghans on Twitter), it was clear in one day that this time the US also wrongly used the ISIS-narrative. He managed to get this in The New York Times in the end.
It’s good that Aikins (and NYT) got rewarded for this work. However, as this cross-check in our paper on ISIS shows again, it comes with a painful realization that throughout the last 20 years these attacks happened on a daily basis in Afghanistan. But more often then not, NYT and others did not cross-check, but just went along with the terrorism-narrative. In last week's newsletter, the example of BBC-veteran John Simpson claiming ISIS was in Afghanistan was based on 1 source, lacking cross-check and any eye for history or context. As such , it is a bad-practice example, that despite a correction by the BBC, did promote the terrorism frame of ISIS in Afghanistan.
For peace purposes, accurate reporting and responsible cross-checks are essential.
Abdul Raouf Khadem
Two days after Saeed Khan’s fifth pledge of allegiance to ‘ISIS’ the Associated Press decided to write again about ISIS.1 This time the source of the article was an Afghan army general from the Afghan province of Helmand, a province where conflict between tribes have escalated also due to the presence of British and US forces. The article did try to cross-check the comment of a party in the conflict (the general) but does not give the reader more than that ‘villagers’ (without specifying, BD) had pointed out Raouf as a member of ISIS because he was ‘walking with black flags’. 2
While substantial sourcing lacked, international media-coverage - always fast selecting news on terrorism - embraced the story quickly. The Washington Post went a step further and published an article with the strong title ‘Meet the Shadowy Figure Recruiting for the Islamic State in Afghanistan’, WP-correspondent in faraway Washington DC did not add any sources able to confirm a link between Raouf and ISIS.3
The BBC also copy pasted AP and added information to the news-announcement, that Raouf himself ‘recently’ ‘pledged allegiance to ISIS’.4 A closer look at the BBC-article revealed that this was an assumption that the journalist did not back up with news sources.
The BBC were not the only ones misrepresenting the news that came from the Associated Press. According to The Daily Mail5 the article proved that the first ISIS base in Afghanistan was situated in the volatile province of Helmand, the Taliban heartland (missing context: Helmand was full of internal conflicts, with Taliban, drugs-interests, and foreign forces), whereas The Independent went a step further (without adding sources) writing about it under the headline: “Syria, Iraq… and now Afghanistan: ISIS advance enters Helmand province for the first time, Afghan officials confirm”.6
Although many mainstream-media outlets introduced Abdul Raouf Khadem as if he was known, he was not. For most of us, it was our first time hearing of him. We tried to find more on him; his story resembled that of many others in Afghanistan. He was a member of the Taliban regime and was a commander under Taliban leader Mullah Omar. After 9/11 he was imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay. When he was released after six years he returned to Afghanistan7 and started working with the Taliban as a shadow-governor for Uruzgan province. Shortly after his release, he was expelled from the organization. The reason for his expulsion is not known. It could be that the Taliban found him too radical and independent after his stint in Guantanamo Bay. It is also possible that internal rivalries within the Taliban played a part. In the area where Raouf is from - Helmand - fighting for control over the poppy fields is common as they provide both the Afghan government and the Taliban with substantial income. Newsweek reported that Raouf had a rivalry with another Helmandi Taliban named Zaker who was heavily involved in the drug-trade. Allegedly, Zaker and Raouf were both aiming for the position as leader of the Taliban military operations which Zaker won.8
As the news of more ISIS in Afghanistan spread across the globe, international media did not report that Abdul Raouf Khadem had already tried several times to set up splinter groups to obtain leverage and revenues, attempts that were ultimately unsuccessful.9 Moreover, the fact that Khadem never openly pledged allegiance to ISIS himself -with a video on Youtube or a statement on paper or any other form of communication - was not reported.
On January 21, The New York Times dug a bit deeper by contacting neighbors of Khadem in the Kajaki-area where he lived whom immediately contextualized and de-sensationalized the story-potential. Some interviewees said Khadem was only ‘sitting at home’, others said he had ‘300 fighters’. In that article General John Campell, leading the NATO-mission in Afghanistan, said he was afraid ISIS will attract attention in Afghanistan, but that to him Khadem was nothing more than a disgruntled Taliban, who ‘is looking for another way to be relevant’. 10 Despite creating more doubt about the story of Khadem, this did not lead to less media-attention nor to a correction at the original source, the Associated Press.
Recognition from the Arab world?
On the contrary. The propaganda channels of ISIS woke up to the story. Five days after the news on Khadem, on January 26th , the so-called ‘director of external operations’ for ISIS in the Arab world, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnan stepped in. The two men who were already linked to the ISIS-narrative in Afghanistan, were now singled out. After requesting recognition for 1.5 year from ISIS (and gaining world media attention with that), this spokesman of ISIS (whose location is unknown) wrote down the name Hafez Saeed Khan in the press release, with the title of leader of the Islamic State in Khorasan.11 12 After announcing that, the director of external operations of ISIS also pointed at the other (only) name that was linked in the media (without solid sourcing) to the ISIS-narrative in Afghanistan: Abdul Raouf Khadem. It’s not clear if he had ever met the Pakistani former Taliban Khan as deputy (The Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban don’t have many good connections and are pretty much two different entities, despite the name Taliban).
While until then we didn’t find any public proof of a connection between Saeed Khan and Raouf, they were now connected by this online statement suggesting a clear hierarchy between the two fighters.
The text - no longer than one paragraph13 - spurred a world wide media coverage. The Wall Street Journal was one of many examples as it wrote about the emergence of ‘ a new frontline’, that ‘the Islamic State adds to Terror in Afghanistan’ and that the publication ‘raises fears that a new frontline could emerge in South and Central Asia’. 14Another example was the BBC that published an article with the headline ‘Islamic State 'recruiting Afghan fighters'’.15
Increased US response
The press statement online, with a name of a spokesman connected to it (we don’t know if this man exists or not) putting the two names as ‘leader’ and ‘deputy’ in one paragraph led to an immediate response from the US.
On February 9th 2015 - two weeks after Abdul Raouf Khadem had been linked to ISIS - he was killed, some say in a drone strike.16 When asked about why Khadem was targeted despite never having claimed an attack in the name of ISIS, US Army Colonel Brian Tribus, the spokesman for Operation Resolute Support, said that now they “had information that they were planning operations against US and Afghan personnel in Afghanistan.” Tribus declined to comment when asked about further details on the information of Khadem planning attacks, and on behalf of who, especially since his boss General Cambell said on January 22 - that Khadem was nothing more than a ‘disgruntled Taliban’. Some inside the Pentagon agreed that the ISIS-presence was ‘nascent at it’s best’ and ‘aspirational’, but that Khadem was a threat to the US and ‘had to be taken out’.17
The first attack on Khadem created more attention for the subject which made the phenomenon of ISIS look very dangerous in Afghanistan. The US Senator John McCain, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, took the microphone during a Senate hearing on Afghanistan. He said that ‘ISIS has spread into Afghanistan’18 and concluded that the US should not lose focus on Afghanistan, “In Afghanistan, we see an initial emergence of ISIS, the threats are real, and the stakes are high. We cannot let Afghanistan become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or ISIS.”19 Other lawmakers pressed to change the plan for a withdrawal of the troops and instead keep them longer in Afghanistan. McCain connects two ‘terrorist groups’ as one threat, AL Qaida and ISIS, even though it’s not clear that they work together, seem to be different groups, and oppose each other in many respects.
After the targeted killing of Raouf we also see the start of an air campaign in Eastern Afghanistan, according to data gathered by the Drone Warfare Project led by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Throughout 2015 and 2016 drone strikes in Afghanistan were concentrated in the eastern part of the country and especially in the province of Nangarhar, the area where Saeed Khan’s group was based. At times, Nangarhar was hit several times a day.20 Many of Saeed Khan’s associates were killed in these strikes and in July 2016 Saeed Khan himself was reported killed.21
However, the air campaign in Nangarhar was more than just a man hunt, it targeted Nangarhar on a large scale and was coordinated with an Afghan led ground offensive.22 The air and ground operations added to the chaos that had plagued Nangarhar for several years.
Three weeks after the killing of Khadem in March 2015, the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, also embraced the ISIS narrative. In a speech in front of the US congress Ghani decided ‘to warn the international community about the threat of ISIS’, reiterating that ISIS was a ‘terrible threat’ to his country. President Ghani, whose government was weak at that time, ended his speech by calling on Congress to increase the US Army presence and power to intervene in his country.23 However, at the time of Ghani’s speech there had been no ISIS claimed attacks in Afghanistan yet.
Click here for Part 3:
Washington Post 2015, “Meet the shadowy figure recruiting for the Islamic State in Afghanistan”, January 13th https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/13/meet-the-shadowy-figure-recruiting-for-the-islamic-state-in-afghanistan/?utm_term=.c55afd8b98e9
http://www.khaama.com/ex-taliban-leader-recruit-people-for-isis-daesh-in-helmand-8942
Dan Lamothe 2015, “Meet the shadowy figure recruiting for the Islamic State in Afghanistan”, Washington Post, January 13th https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/01/13/meet-the-shadowy-figure-recruiting-for-the-islamic-state-in-afghanistan/?utm_term=.c55afd8b98e9
David Loyn 2015 “Islamic State 'recruiting Afghan fighters'” BBC News, January 12th, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30777565
Damien Gayle and AP 2015 “ ISIS sets up its first base in Afghanistan, run by former Guantanamo prisoner now operating out of Helmand less than three months after British troops left the region” Daily Mail, January 14th,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2910420/ISIS-sets-base-Afghanistan-run-former-Guantanamo-prisoner-operating-Helmand-three-months-British-troops-left-region.html
Adam Withnall 2015, “Syria, Iraq… and now Afghanistan: Isis advance enters Helmand province for the first time, Afghan officials confirm” The Independent, January 13th, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-iraq-and-now-afghanistan-isis-advance-enters-helmand-province-for-the-first-time-afghan-9974304.html
Josh Levs and Masoud Popalzai 2015 “ISIS recruiter, once freed from Gitmo by U.S., killed in drone strike in Afghanistan” CNN, February 13th http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/09/world/afghanistan-violence/
Sami Yousafzai 2011, “TWELVE OF AFPAK'S MOST WANTED INSURGENTS: A GUIDE” Newsweek, October 10th http://www.newsweek.com/twelve-afpaks-most-wanted-insurgents-guide-66549
Anand Gopal, 2012 “Serious Leadership Rifts Emerge in Afghan Taliban” Combatting Terrorism Center, November 28th https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/serious-leadership-rifts-emerge-in-afghan-taliban
Taliban Fissures in Afghanistan Are Seen as an Opening for ISIS, The New York Times, January 21 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/world/asia/taliban-fissures-in-afghanistan-are-seen-as-an-opening-for-isis.html?_r=0
Borhan Osman 2016, “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 27th, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/
Sean McCormac 2015 “It’s Official: Islamic State is in Central Asia”, Center for Security Policy, January 27th, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/01/27/its-official-islamic-state-is-in-central-asia/
Statement of al-Adnan: “We bring the mujāhidīn the good news of the Islamic State’s expansion to Khurāsān (a region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other nearby lands). Indeed, the mujāhidīn from amongst the soldiers of the Khilāfah have fulfilled the conditions and met the requirements for the declaration of Wilāyat Khurāsān. They have announced their bay’ah to Amīrul-Mu’minīn (may Allah preserve him) Khalīfah Ibrāhīm, and he has accepted it and appointed the noble Shaykh Hāfidh Sa’īd Khān (may Allah preserve him) as the Wālī of Wilāyat Khurāsān, and appointed as his deputy the noble Shaykh ‘Abdur-Ra’ūf Khādim Abū Talhah (may Allah preserve him). Therefore, we call upon all the muwahhidīn in Khurāsān to join the caravan of the Khilāfah and abandon disunity and factionalism. So come to your state, O mujāhidīn! Come to your Khilāfah, for you are the forerunners. You have fought the English, the Russians, and the Americans, and upon you today is a new fight; a fight to enforce tawhīd (monotheism) and vanquish shirk (polytheism). So come forth, humbling yourselves before Allah, and Allah will honor you and raise you. Come forth, for this is an opportunity for the Muslims and it has not yet passed you by, so do not lose it. We call upon all the soldiers of the Islamic State who are in Khurāsān to listen to and obey the Wālī, Hāfidh Sa’īd Khān, and his deputy (may Allah preserve them both), and to prepare for the great tribulations they will face. The factions will assemble against you and the rifles and bayonets will multiply against you. But you are up to it, with Allah’s permission.”
“Islamic State Adds to Terror In Afghanistan”, Wall Street Journal, January 11th, https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-adds-to-terror-in-afghanistan-1421008584
David Loyn 2015 “Islamic State 'recruiting Afghan fighters'” BBC News, January 12th, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30777565
Fazul Rahim and Mushtaq Yusufzai 2015, “ISIS Commander Abdul Rauf Killed in Afghanistan: Officials”, NBC News, February 9th, https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-commander-abdul-rauf-killed-afghanistan-officials-n302771
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/232588-pentagon-isis-nascent-in-afghanistan
Kevin Knodell, 2015 “All the reasons why the Islamic State won’t have it easy”, War is Boring, February 13th, https://medium.com/war-is-boring/all-the-reasons-islamic-state-wont-have-it-easy-in-afghanistan-42a1deeb0f27
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism “The drone Warfare Project” https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war
Al Jazeera, 2016, “Report: ISIL leader Hafiz Saeed killed in US strike” August 12th, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/report-isil-leader-hafiz-saeed-killed-strike-160812175040690.html
Habib Khan Totakhil and Jessica Donati, 2016, “Afghan Forces Dislodge Islamic State From Eastern Stronghold” Wall Street Journal, February 21st, https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-forces-dislodge-islamic-state-from-eastern-stronghold-1456084637