(Part 1) How to report on ISIS-attacks?

Fourth Newsletter

May 04, 2022

The idea for this week’s newsletters came after the recent horrific attacks in Afghanistan - claimed or attributed to ISIS. It reminded me of research I did with one of my students, at Sciences Po, on the first attacks attributed to ISIS in Afghanistan (From 2014 on).

We discussed this paper at a conference in Oslo (of the FFI), NOREF published it at some point internally, and now you can read it here.

With this research (which will be shared in three parts) we zoom out from the ongoing practice of coverage in countries like Afghanistan, where there is a strong focus on claims and attributions to the attacks - sometimes ISIS claims it, other times the Taliban or the US government point at ISIS.

Often we work with these PR- statements as journo’s, and attribute these attacks quickly.

But this paper shows that, in order to accurately portray the strength of terrorist groups, it is important to take these propaganda-sources into account, but not use them as a single source (Which is almost 100% of the time the case as we can see in this paper). It’s often said, the ISIS -coverage reminds me of the following saying: The spokesman says it’s raining outside, but the journalist doesn’t go outside to look, but just writes down that it rains outside.

For this research Mikael and I didn’t go outside, and did not visit the attacks-sites. That would have been ideal.

Recently we saw a rare example of a journalist going outside, and checking out the situation on the ground- and question the attributions to an attack. In the last drone-attack of the US government in Afghanistan, the government pointed immediately at ISIS, however Matthieu Aikins later visited the easily accessible spot in Kabul and debunked this claim (Soon CNN would follow).

For this research we cross-checked at least 15 ‘ISIS-attacks’. We looked at the use of propaganda-sources, and compared it with other available online research, and re-evaluated the used sourcing.

We did this mostly from Paris but it turns out, deconstructing propaganda-lines of the parties in the conflict does not require much, but mostly a critical eye.

About the co-author: Mikael Maerker was a student at Sciences Po Paris. A near-fluent Arabic speaker, Mikael worked in Ramallah for ICRC, and is now in Erbil for the same organization. Before he was interning for the International Refugee Assistance Project. He has worked for the Swedish Migration Agency and volunteered with the Swedish Red Cross.

Where did the story of ISIS in Afghanistan start? Considering the reports on ISIS one might think that it was a well-organized beginning, where the ISIS command was involved in implementing their new arm in South Asia. A narrative further strengthened by president Donald Trump’s decision to drop the Mother of All Bombs on an ISIS branded group in March of 2017.

Two YouTube-clips

The first signs of ISIS in Afghanistan did not come from Raqqa but through YouTube. In July 2014 two Afghans claimed to be ISIS with the help of two separate videos. The two Afghans, Sheikh Abdul Qahir Khorasani from the province Kunar and Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost based in Peshawar pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Bahgdadi. Both Afghans were known to support the Pakistani Taliban but did not have close relationships with the Afghan Taliban. The Youtube-films were not picked up by the Western mainstream media and - as a possible consequence of that - ISIS in Raqqa never acknowledged the pledges through any of their means of communication.

It was not surprising that the two Afghans were largely ignored in Afghanistan, and weren’t able to gain Afghan media-attention. The two were Salafi-clerics which explains their loyalty towards the Pakistani Taliban, al-Qaida and now also ISIS. Although some Western journalists and politicians suggest that Afghanistan easily embraces ISIS’ ideas, in fact ISIS’ version of strict Salafi-Jihadism is a rare find in the country. Afghanistan is dominated by an orthodox Sufi interpretation of Islam. Salafism considers sufism to be an impure version of Islam because of the many “invented” traditions and practices. Salafism is only found in small pockets in Afghanistan, like in Kunar province where it has been practiced since the ‘80’s. The Afghan Taliban does not support Salafism and they were ideologically opposed to al-Qaida’s global and militant vision just as they are opposed to ISIS’ similar worldview.

How the BBC brought the ISIS-narrative to Afghanistan

In this Afghan anti-ISIS-context, on the 2nd of September 2014, renowned BBC-journalist John Simpson suggested that he had found the first group in Afghanistan that supported ISIS. The headline of his article stated that an ‘Afghanistan-based group of militants’ belonging to the radical Islamist group Hizb Islami - that rose to power during the US-funded Jihad against the Soviets- ‘may join ISIS’.

The article soon attracted attention from other media outlets and the information in Simpson’s article was reprinted and the news that ISIS had arrived in Afghanistan, spread all over the world.12

Despite the Western mainstream media’s interest in this article, it is worth having another look at the sourcing of the claims Simpson made. Who was speaking on behalf of who? How in-depth was the research on this group’s new interest in ISIS?

In the introduction Simpson stated that Hizb Islami not only wanted to join ISIS but that they were also - in his words - “allied” to the Taliban. Therefore, he suggests, there was a strong possibility that the Taliban would also consider supporting the Iraq and Syria based terrorist group. Simpson doesn't seem to know about the hard stance of the Taliban against ISIS-ideology. Also, Simpson doesn't tell its readers the essential information that until this day, it is common knowledge in Afghanistan that Hizb Islami and the Taliban do not have a very good relationship. There is at this present moment no proof of a political alliance between the two of them. They also have different backgrounds and ideologies. Even before 0911, Hizb Islami was not part of the Taliban regime and that did not change after the US invasion. Today, Hizb Islami is now part of the Afghan government and ‘surrendered’, an offer that the Taliban refused.

Moreover, the claim that those Hizb Islami -members might join ISIS was based on only one source. The norm in journalism is that ‘one source is no source’. Sometimes it can be difficult to find a second source to cross-check certain information but that should not have applied here. It would have been possible to contact the spokesperson of Hizb Islami - his number is available in Kabul - and ask him if it was true that they would join ISIS.3

The only source that was quoted in the BBC-article identified as commander Mirwais, who did not reveal his last name but who was happy to appear in the photo. Mirwais turned out to live close to the city of Kabul. In the article Mirwais was introduced as a member of the Islamist group Hizb Islami in Afghanistan and because he was a member of the group Simpson suggested that he spoke on behalf of it and that Hizb Islami would therefore support ISIS.4

However, the article did not quote Mirwais saying that Hizb Islami would pledge allegiance to ISIS. He was also not quoted as a spokesman on behalf of the group. Mirwais was quoted as saying he was observing the operations of ISIS in the Arab world and that he claimed to have contacts with ‘Daesh members’ although it was not clear who these members might be. Mirwais also did not say he would join ISIS, but he thought they were ‘great mujahideen’, and he told the BBC that ‘his group was waiting to see if ISIS meet the requirements for a true Islamic caliphate.”5

A day after the article was published, the BBC itself intervened and recognized that the sourcing of the article - and the firm claims the journalist made - were problematic. The BBC revised the headline saying: Correction 4 September: The headline of this article was revised to reflect the fact that in his interview Commander Mirwais was speaking for himself and his group of fighters, and not on behalf of Hezb-e-Islami, whose official position is not to have any ties with ISIS.

After the publication of the BBC article Hizb Islami released a statement distancing themselves from ISIS.6

Second claim false

Three weeks after the BBC falsely claimed that ISIS had arrived in Afghanistan another such claim was published by Western media. This second time those media suggested ISIS had carried out its first attack in Afghanistan.7 The story centered around gruesome mass-beheadings in the Afghan province of Ghazni. The local governor, the main source for the story, said that ISIS was behind an attack on a village held by government forces and that ‘hundreds of people died’ and many of them had been beheaded. Other media copied the Governor’s statement without further investigation. Mainly the story spread in local media,8 but also Foreign Policy published an article with the headline ‘ISIS makes inroads in Afghanistan, Pakistan’. 9

It was not long until the story was exposed as false. The Afghan governor and other local officials had tried to manipulate the mainstream media for their own benefit. There were no beheadings, and none of the sources could confirm a death toll reaching the hundreds. The firm claim that ‘militants aligned with ISIS’ attacked the town was also not confirmed.10 Later the NATO spokesman in Kabul also denied the Governor’s version of the story saying that ‘It was enormously exaggerated’.11

Four months after the attack, the New York Times reported that the local official admitted to lying about the magnitude of the attack and an ISIS-presence in order to persuade Kabul to deploy reinforcements.12

Pakistan supporting ISIS?

In the end of 2014, reports of an ISIS presence in Afghanistan emerged from the district of Achin in the eastern province of Nangarhar where, two and half years later, Trump would decide to use the Mother of All Bombs. At the center of the early reports was a former Pakistani Taliban commander under the name of Hafez Saeed Khan who had to flee to Achin together with his tribesmen. He would go on to publish a number of videos pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi.

However, in order to understand why ISIS-claims popped up in Achin, and what the role of the former Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander was, it’s important to understand the current and past situation in Achin. The unrest in the area started many years before ISIS-claims were heard from the Arab world in 2012. While the West ambitioned good governance following the invasion of Afghanistan, Achin and Nangarhar is a prime example of how the Western strategies failed. The inhabitants lived under a corrupt government which was seen as a stealing, land-grabbing and exploiting entity. Such an insecure environment where groups are excluded is always at risk of pushing youth to choose the wrong path and provide an environment easily exploited by terrorist and criminal groups searching for safe havens.

While the situation was escalating in Achin and the surrounding region, the area would be affected by the Pakistani military operations against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in 2010 and onward. The operations pushed fighters across the border into Achin and the surrounding areas. Most of the fighters were Pakistani Orakazai and Afridi tribesman who had tribal relationships across the border.

In the beginning the tribes lived peacefully side by side13 but that changed in 2013 when the heavily divided TTP lost their leader in a targeted drone attack. In the aftermath, more than six splinter groups - searching for a new future - were created.14 One group was led by Hafez Saeed Khan - until recently the TTP commander in Orakzai.

Saeed Khan wanted to profit from the power-vacuum and tried hard to become the new leader of the TTP. He had tried it before, and time and time again he didn’t manage to become the number one TTP. That loss made Khan flee the ongoing Pakistani operations and he traveled to Achin and took with him groups of Afridis and Orakzais as big as 500, then roaming Achin and the surrounding districts.15 The locals noticed a change in the Pakistani tribesmen’s composure towards them and a rift started to grow that quickly escalated. Some Afghans blamed the Pakistani ISI for creating the tribal-uproar in Achin, there is no indication that Raqqa (ISIS-hq?) was involved. At that time, ISIS in the Arab world attracted more and more attention from international media which mostly inspired locals and soon black flags were carried around by the Pakistani fighters.

Because of the lack of a functioning Afghan government the Pakistani tribesmen were uncontested in Achin. However, that was not the only reason for their large freedom of movement. In 2014 those fighters were supported by the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), something that didn’t make it into the Western media at that time. The NDS decided to support the Achin-based Pakistani fighters as part of a tit-for-tat strategy aimed at strengthening them in their fight against the Pakistani army that in turn supported the Afghan Taliban.16

When in the fall of 2014 president Ghani took office he made a 180 degree shift in the NDS-policy towards the Pakistani fighters. Ghani decided to seek to cooperate with the Pakistani army instead hoping to crush the violent elements of both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban on both sides of the border, among them the disgruntled Pakistani leader Saeed Khan.

On October 5th 2014, the spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, Shahidullah Shahid, surprised everyone by issuing a statement saying that the TTP supported ISIS. “Oh our brothers, we are proud of you in your victories. We are with you in your happiness and your sorrow,” Shahid went on to say that the TTP would provide ISIS with “every possible support”.17

After several days of speculation concerning a possible TTP pledge of allegiance to ISIS, the spokesman was forced by the leadership to issue a clarifying statement on the TTP’s position on ISIS, an event that received less coverage than the first statement. The spokesman backtracked on his previous statement, but this was not enough to appease the leadership. He was thrown out of the movement. Subsequently, he moved on by pledging allegiance to ISIS on October 14th.

In his statement he said in Arabic that he pledges allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi together with five other Pakistani Taliban, one of them being Hafez Saeed Khan, the Orakzai tribal leader residing in Achin. This pledge made international headlines again, like by Reuters who reported that ISIS had ‘been making inroads into South Asia’ .18 However, in the audio clip - available on Youtube - Shahid reveals information that was not reported. Shahid was never able to make contact with IS Iraq and Syria. The video was actually his fourth attempt to contact ISIS as earlier attempts were neglected by IS Iraq and Syria. The ‘inroads’ existed in the press article from Reuters but was in reality a desperate call for recognition from a group of disgruntled TTP fighters who ended the recording with a plea of recognition “let there return an acceptance and a response and let it be our last request, praise be to God”.19

On January 11th 2015, the group published its fifth attempt to attract the attention of ISIS and it is much crueler. Some academics say that terrorism is theater and this video was a good example of that saying. If you become more lethal and extreme the chances increase that you will be noticed on the international stage. The video was accompanied by loud aggressive Koranic reciting and showed the copy pasted ISIS logo and dramatic scenes with heavily armed warriors carrying ISIS flags galloping on horses. Shock value was added by showing the beheading of a Pakistani soldier. The international media covered the event as a sign of an ISIS presence in Afghanistan. For example, some reported that “Militants Loyal to ISIS Unveil Leaders for Af-Pak Region”.20 The BBC wrote a headline that read “Islamic State 'recruiting Afghan fighters'”.21 None of the media outlets reported that the group were not linked to any group yet, but that they were desperately seeking ISIS’s recognition but that they had so far failed.

For Part 2 click here:

Bette’s Newsletter

(Part 2) How to report on ISIS-attacks?

Below is the continuation of last week’s newsletter on attributions of responsibility for attacks. An attack is a form of communication. The question is who did it, and why. Acts of violence in Afghanistan are often attributed to an ideological framework (a system of thought) which is that of terrorism. We long percieved Afghanistan as a country with a…

3 years ago · 2 likes · Bette Dam